Oct 7, 2018
Security researchers at ESET have recognized a new rootkit that takes perseverance to a whole new level. As soon as infected, the LoJax rootkit will remain working on an appliance even if the operating system is reinstalled or the hard drive is reformatted or substituted.
Rootkits are malevolent code that is used to provide an attacker with continuous administrator access to an infected appliance. They are tough to notice and subsequently, they can remain active on an appliance for long periods, permitting cybercriminals to access an infected appliance at will, thieve information, or infect the appliance with more malware variations.
Although reformatting a hard drive and reinstalling the operating system can typically remove a malware infection, that is not the case for the LoJax rootkit because it compromises the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) – The interface between the firmware of an appliance and its operating system. The UEFI runs pre-boot apps and manages the booting of the operating system. As the LoJax rootkit continues in Flash memory, even substituting a hard drive will have no effect.
The LoJax rootkit may not be noticed as most antivirus programs don’t check the UEFI for malware. Even if the rootkit is noticed, removing it is far from straightforward. Removal needs the firmware to be flashed.
A lot of cybersecurity experts consider these UEFI rootkits to theoretical instead of actively being used in real-world attacks, as ESET remarks in a fresh blog post. “UEFI rootkits are generally seen as extremely risky tools for executing cyberattacks. No UEFI rootkit has ever been noticed in the wild – until we discovered a campaign that effectively positioned a malevolent UEFI module on a victim’s system.” The rootkit was fitted by a threat group known as Fancy Bear, a cyberespionage group supposed to have strong connections to the Russian military intelligence organization, GRU.
LoJax is not, in itself, an information taker. It is a backdoor that permits a system to be retrieved at will for spying purposes, data thievery, or for the fitting of malware. It can also permit an infected appliance to be followed geographically.
What is vague is how the attackers gained access to the device to fit the rootkit. ESET considers the most likely way that was reached was with a spear phishing electronic mail. As soon as access to the appliance was achieved, the UEFI memory was read, an image was generated, then changed, and the firmware was substituted with the rootkit fitted. The rootkit was fitted on an older appliance which had several other kinds of malware fitted. More modern appliances have controls in place to avoid such attacks – Secure Boot for example. However, that doesn’t necessarily imply they are protected.
“Companies must study the Secure Boot construction on their hardware and make certain they are constructed properly to avoid illegal access to the firmware memory,” wrote safety intelligence team lead at ESET, Alexis Dorais-Joncas. “They also require to think about controls for noticing malware at the UEFI/BIOS level.”